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A CRITIQUE OF HENRIK FRIBERG-FERNROS'S DEFENSE OF THE 
SUBSTANCE VIEW 
William Simkulet
ABSTRACT 
Keywords: abortion, substance view, Rob Lovering, Henrik Friberg-Fernros, spontaneous abortion 
Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously 
morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent 
value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative 
criticisms of the anti-abortion position taken by the substance view - the 
rescue argument and the problem of spontaneous abortion. Henrik 
Friberg-Femros offers an interesting response to Lovering, but one I 
argue would be inconsistent with the anti-abortion stance taken by most 
substance view theorists. 
A CRITIQUE OF HENRIK FRIBERG­
FERNROS'S DEFENSE OF THE 
SUBSTANCE VIEW 
Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is 
seriously morally wrong because it is the killing of some­
thing with the same right to life as you or I .  In his recent 
article The Substance View: a Critique1 Rob Lovering offers 
two compelling arguments against the substance view. 
First, Lovering asks us to consider a scenario in which res­
cuers have to choose between saving either a 10 year old 
boy or an embryo. The substance view theorist seems to be 
committed to the position that both the boy and the 
embryo are morally equivalent, and thus saving either 
would be morally justified; Lovering however contends 
that most ofus would choose to save the boy, suggesting we 
believe the boy has more moral worth than the embryo. 
Call this the rescue argument. Second, he cri ticizes the sub­
stance view theorist for their inattention to spontaneous 
abortions, which i t  is estimated end 60% of pregnancies.2 
Call this the problem of spontaneous abortion. 
1 R. Lovering. The Substance View: A Critique. Bioethics 2012; 27(5):
263 270. 
2 C.E. Boklage. Survival Probability of Human Conceptions from Fer
tilization to Term. Int J Fertil 1990; 35(2): 75 94; H. Leridon. 1977. 
Hwnan Fertility: The Basic Components. Chicago, IL: Chicago Univer 
sity Press. 
In A Critique of Rob Lovering's Criticism of the Sub­
stance View3 Henrik Friberg-Fernros replies to these 
arguments. First, Friberg-Fernros contends that the rele­
vant difference between the 10-year-old boy and the 
embryo is that one has greater time relative interests 
than the other. Call this the time relative interests reply. 
Second, he argues that because most spontaneous abor­
tions are impossible to prevent, we cannot have a moral 
obligation to prevent them. Furthermore, he contends, 
because of the relatively low time relative interests of the 
spontaneously aborted embryos, their deaths are less bad 
than the death of human infants . 
Here I argue that Friberg-Fernros's response fails to 
adequately address the problems raised by Lovering. First, 
by relying upon time relative interests to explain the 
greater badness resulting from the deaths of non-fetuses, 
he undermines the substance-view's anti-abortion claim 
that the death of a fetus is the same kind of harm as our 
deaths; for Friberg-Fernros the loss of a human fetus 
whether in a disaster or via spontaneous abortion is a 
much lesser loss than the loss of you or me.4 This stance 
would severely undermine the substance view's criticism 
of abortion. Second, Friberg-Fernros misses the point of 
the problem of spontaneous abortion; Lovering contends 
3 H Friberg Fernros. A Critique of Rob Lovering's Criticism of the Sub 
stance View. Bioethics 2015; 29(3): 211 216. 
4 Ibid: 212.
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that spontaneous abortion is the loss of something the
substance view identifies as valuable. Even if these deaths
are entirely outside of our control and their lives less val-
uable than non-fetuses (as Friberg-Fernros seems to hold)
for the substance view their deaths still matter, yet it
seems that we ignore them entirely. We do not mourn the
loss of spontaneously aborted children; yet the substance
view is committed to the proposition that the loss of spon-
taneously aborted children is comparable to the loss of
you or me. If this is the case, then our attitudes towards
spontaneous abortion are morally negligent.
THE SUBSTANCE VIEW
According to many proponents of the substance view:5
(1) You and I are essentially rational agents.
(2) Rational agents are inherently valuable. (All else
being equal, the loss of such a being is seriously
morally bad.)
(3) Rational agents have a right to life. (All else being
equal, it is seriously wrong to kill such a being.)
With regard to abortion, substance view theorists
hold:
(4) Human fetuses are, from the moment of concep-
tion, rational agents.6
(5) Therefore human abortion - the killing of human
fetuses - is the killing of inherently valuable
beings with a right to life, and thus all else being
equal, seriously morally wrong. (From (2), (3)
and (4).)
Human fetuses do not exhibit first-order rationality, or
the capacity to immediately engage in rational delibera-
tion; however substance view theorists contend that what
matters, morally, is second-order rationality, or the
capacity to develop first-order rationality at some point
in the future (given the appropriate conditions).7 Propo-
nents of the substance view believe that what matters,
morally, is being the kind of thing that possesses second-
order rationality; first-order rationality is merely an acci-
dental trait. (For substance view theorists at least those
opposed to abortion a thing undergoes a substantial
change when it gains or loses the second-order capacity
for rationality, but doesnt undergo a substantial change
when it gains or loses the first-order capacity for ration-
ality.)8 Substance view theorists sometimes talk as
though what matters is being a human or a person; for
example Friberg-Fernros says Proponents of the sub-
stance view hold that abortion is wrong because the
embryo is already a human person and, as such, entitled
to basic human rights.9 However substance view theo-
rists would also hold that that non-biologically human
persons, like angels or visitors from space, would matter
morally, so long as they have the second-order capacity
for rationality.
1.1 The Rescue Argument
Lovering asks us to consider the following hypothetical
situation:
Rescue: During hurricane Katrina, police officers
face a choice: save a frozen human embryo or save a
ten-year-old boy. The officers choose to save the fro-
zen embryo. When asked why, the officers replied
that they couldnt save both and because both the
embryo and the 10-year-old boy were of equal stand-
ing, they flipped a coin.10
5 F. Beckwith. 2007. Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against
Abortion Choice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; P. Lee &
R.P. George. 2007. Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Poli
tics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; P. Lee &R.P. George.
The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity. Ratio Juris 2008; 21(2):
179 193; P. Lee. The Pro Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A
Defense. Bioethics 2004; 18(3): 249 263; P. Lee & R.P. George. The
Wrong of Abortion. 2005. In Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics.
A.I. Cohen & C.H. Wellman, eds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing:
13 26; R.P. George & C. Tollefsen. 2008. Embryo: A Defense of Human
Life. New York, NY: Doubleday; F. Beckwith. 2007. Defending Life:
A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press. P. Lee & G. Grisez. Total Brain Death:
A Reply to Alana Shewmon. Bioethics 2008; 26(5): 275 284. P. Lee, C.
Tollefsen & R.P. George. The ontological status of embryos: a reply to
Jason reMorris. JMed Philos 2014; 39(5): 483 504.
6 By human fetus here I mean to pick out any developing biologically
human organism. There is important and nuanced debate about whether
such abeing at its earliest of stages is numerically and/or personally iden
tical to the adult human organism that it will become; for the purposes
of this paper I will assume that this is the case, as most substance view
theorists do. Regarding the identity debate, Jeff McMahan contends
that we are essentially psychological agents, numerically distinct from
our bodies, and do not come into existence until after our brains
develop, while others such as DonMarquis, Barry Smith and Bergit Bro
gaard contend that a single human organism does not come into exis
tence until after cell specialization begins. See: J. McMahan 2002. The
Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. New York: Oxford
University Press; B. Smith & B. Brogaard. Sixteen Days. J Med
Philos2003; 28(1):45 78; D. Marquis. The Moral Principle Objection to
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research. Metaphilosophy 2007; 38(2 3):
190 206.
7 See: P. Lee and G. Grisez. Total Brain Death: A Reply to Alan Sheow
mon.Bioethics 2012; 26(5): 275 284.
8 To illustrate this, consider Michael Tooleys well known example of a
kitten that is injected with a chemical that will turn it into a person in
nine months. When injected, the kitten is given the second order
capacity for rationality, but will only obtain the first order capacity for
rationality after nine months. In personal correspondence, Patrick Lee
has confirmed that his version of the substance view would hold that the
kitten substance ceases to be (is killed) when it is injectedwith the chemi
cal, and a new rational substantive a human person for Friberg
Fernros comes into existence in its place. See M. Tooley. Abortion and
Infanticide.Philos Public Aff 1972. 2(1): 37 65.
9 Friberg Fernros, op. cit. note 3, p. 211.
10 Adapted from Lovering 2012, op. cit. note 1, p. 266.
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Lovering contends that the substance view would com-
mit the officers to flipping a coin in this situation, but
that this would be absurd. Most of us, he contends,
believe we ought to save the boy in such a case. Substance
view theorists George and Tollefsen agree, saying that
most of us would save an older child over the embryo, but
contend that this doesnt mean the embryo isnt inherently
valuable and may be killed.11 To this, Lovering says:
George and Tollefsen are certainly correct on all
counts: most people would save the five-year-old. . .
and that most people would save the five-year-old
does not entail that human embryos are not human
beings (at least, genetically speaking) or that human
embryos may be deliberately killed. . . Even so,
Georges and Tollefsens answer misses the point
entirely. This and other whom-should-you-save cases
are invoked in an attempt to figure out whether we
really believe (intuitively) that human embryos have
the same intrinsic value and moral standing as indi-
viduals [whose deaths we agree would be a substan-
tial loss], an essential step in the evaluation of
arguments from inference to the best explanation.12
Friberg-Fernros summarizes this, saying Lovering
consequently presupposes that one cannot prioritize the
born human being at the expense of an embryo without
denying the embryo the status of being a person.13 But,
it seems, Friberg-Fernros misses the point as well inso-
far as most of us would prioritize the 10-year-old, this is
evidence that we think the 10-year-old is, all things being
equal, more morally important than the human zygote.
The question, then, is how much more important is the
10-year-old than the zygote.
1.2 The Time Relative Interests Reply
Friberg-Fernros proposes a possible explanation for why
we would prefer to save the 10-year-old over the frozen
embryo the former has what he calls a strong time rel-
ative interest.14 A person has a strong time relative inter-
est if there is a strong psychological unity between that
person and their future selves. Embryos lack any psycho-
logical unity to their future selves, and thus lack any
time relative interests.
Suppose that rather than choose whom to save, the
police officers choose whom to kill. The killing of the
embryo would be a violation of the embryos right to
life, but the killing of the 10-year-old child would both
be the violation of the childs right to life and the viola-
tion of the childs time relative interests. This additional
harm makes it worse to kill a substance with first-order
rationality than a substance that only possesses second-
order rationality.
Friberg-Fernros asks Now, what about the choice
between 10 embryos and one child?15 Insofar as sub-
stance view theorists are not consequentialists, they need
not choose the 10 over the one. However, he continues
[S]elf-evidently, all reasonable theories must stipulate that,
ceteris paribus, one should choose to rescue more persons
rather than fewer. The question is then, of course, whether
the additional evils which are generated by the death of
one child outweigh the death of 10 embryos. I think it can
be reasonable to answer no to that question.
Despite this, just as many of us would prioritize the
10-year-old boy over a single human embryo, it seems
many of us would prioritize the 10-year-old boy over 10
human embryos especially given there is no indication,
let alone guarantee, that the embryos would ever be
implanted! Friberg-Fernros is aware of this objection,
though, and continues If that would be the only reason-
able answer, then Loverings charge of reductio ad
absurdum would still stand. However, that is not the
only reasonable response.16
Before we look at the other response Friberg-Fernros
has in mind, its important to note that the existence of
another rational response will not save his position.
What Lovering, and many of us, would find absurd here
is the idea that, all else being equal, it would be reasona-
ble to prioritize the 10 embryos over the one child. Even
if we knew (contrary to statistics on spontaneous abor-
tion) that all ten of the embryos, were they to be
implanted, would grow into full persons, this would not
be sufficient to get us all to prioritize them over the
child. But why not? One explanation is that we dont
find second-order rationality (the capacity to become a
rational moral agent) to be anywhere near as valuable,
morally, as the first-order rationality the child presently
possesses; but this explanation would undermine the
anti-abortion substance view position.
To illustrate another reasonable response, Friberg-
Fernros asks us to consider choosing between saving
either one 10 year-old child or two infants. Many of us,
he says, would choose the child over the infants. The rea-
son one might choose this way, he says, relates to time
relative interests. Friberg-Fernros seeks to show that the
reason for choosing the 10-year-old over two infants is
not stronger than choosing the 10-year-old over 10
embryos; as such the substance view would be open to
choosing a single human person over 10 human person
embryos. He says:
Firstly, I think that one prevents more additional
evil in choosing to rescue the 10-year-old child over11 George and Tollefsen, op. cit. note 5, p.139.
12 Lovering, op. cit. note 1, p. 266.
13 Friberg Fernros, op. cit. note 3, p.211.
14 Ibid: 212.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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the two infants. For example, in ordinary cases, the
death of two infants will cause more grief than the
death of ten embryos, which means that the net
effect of preventing additional evil is probably
greater in the former compared to the latter case.17
What Friberg-Fernros seems to miss here is that the
substance view like most anti-abortion positions con-
tends that the loss of a human life is one of the worst
evils that can occur. It is hard to imagine that any
amount of grief could outweigh the loss of even one
human life for such views.18 The fact that more people
would mourn the loss of a single child than the loss of
two infants or ten fetuses is, in itself, evidence that we
place more value on the child than infants or fetuses.
Next Friberg-Fernros notes the high mortality rate of
human embryos, contending that the difference in surviv-
ability between infants and embryos is another relevant
factor for substance view theorists. However, this line of
reflection, too, seems to miss the point. For the sub-
stance view theorist, a frozen human embryo already has
a full right to life, regardless of whether or not it is
implanted; its life is said to be, all else being equal, com-
parable to the life of you or me, as would its premature
death. The fact that embryos are less likely to survive
than non-embryos would not be sufficient to show that
their lives are less worth preserving; at best it would
show that their lives are less likely to be successfully pre-
served. However, this might just as easily count as evi-
dence that we should be more concerned with trying to
mitigate risks to embryos than infants because the for-
mer are in more danger than the latter; after all, infants
are certainly less likely to survive than teenagers, but
parents with multiple children are clearly morally justi-
fied in focusing their attention on their more at-risk chil-
dren, all else being equal.
Because human embryos can survive frozen for quite
some time, our moral obligations to provide them with
the means for a good life may take a back seat to our
duties to presently born people (who cannot simply be
frozen and provided for later), but this ability to defer
our obligations does not make them lesser organisms for
the substance view. In fact, in some scenarios, this fact
may make the difference between saving a single human
embryo and a single 10-year-old child. For example, in
lifeboat cases, it may be easier to keep a single human
embryo frozen than to feed a 10-year-old child; and if
rescue is uncertain, the substance view theorist ought to
prioritize the frozen embryo over the 10-year-old child.
If we find such a conclusion absurd, so much the worse
for the substance view.
1.3 Is Friberg-Fernross Substance View Anti-
Abortion?
Friberg-Fernros says:
[S]ince the magnitude of additional evil generated by
our choices and the survival probability of the res-
cued entities are relevant factors to consider for the
proponents of the substance view when they deter-
mine what choice should be made in this situation, it
follows that the quantitative difference between res-
cuing one 10-year-old child over two infants com-
pared with rescuing one child over 10 embryos, is
not necessarily decisive for proponents of this view.19
Proponents of the substance view contend that abor-
tion is a serious moral harm the killing of a (second-
order) rational substance with a full right to life whose
life it would be seriously wrong to end. However, on
Friberg-Fernross account, the life of a fetus, it seems, is
not all that wrong to end. Although the substance view
maintains that a human fetus is the same kind of sub-
stance as a 10-year-old human child; Friberg-Fernros
seems to be committed to defending the reasonableness
of our giving preference to a single 10-year-old human
child over a substantively larger number of infants or
fetuses; he explains that the additional badness of the
deaths of those human substances could be outweighed
by the loss of the single childs time relative interests
and/or because more people would mourn his loss than
that of the infants or fetuses.
It makes sense to say that grief is morally relevant; if
one was faced with a choice between two options that
produced different amounts of grief, but that were other-
wise morally equivalent, there is good reason to think
one should choose the option that would produce less
grief, as grief is prima facie morally undesirable. Yet, for
most of us, it seems the prevention of grief is a relatively
low priority compared to the prevention of the loss of
human life. It strikes me as quite absurd to suggest that
the amount of grief that one would feel over, say, the loss
of a famous, well-liked actor, would outweigh the loss of
life of an additional person (or nine additional people);
so let us set aside the grief argument and focus on the
importance of time relative interests.
Jeff McMahan contends that what makes the deaths
of beings like you or me seriously morally bad is that we
possess first-order rationality. In contrast, beings like
17 Ibid: 213.
18 This stands in sharp contrast to consequentialist theories; consider
act utilitarianism, the consequentialist normative ethical theory that says
the right thing to do in any situation is to act to maximize overall happi
ness; for the utilitarian it would be morally required to kill innocent peo
ple if doing so resulted in a net gain of happiness for all those affected.
On such aview, we could kill innocent people on live television if enough
people enjoyed the spectacle to outweigh the loss of utility of said inno
cent people, and all the spectators whowould be (understandably) horri
fied by such a spectacle. 19 Ibid 213.
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fetuses and infants, which possess only second-order
rationality, the badness of their deaths is determined by
their time relativist interests. However, for the first sev-
eral months of pregnancy human fetuses lack time rela-
tive interests, and in light of this he concludes that
abortion is not seriously morally wrong.20 It is, at least
according to this view, not the killing of something with
the same moral weight as you or I.
If Friberg-Fernros is committed to the claim that
allowing two infants to die is less bad than allowing one
10-year-old child to die, it seems he is committed to this
claim because the additional harm to the 10-year-old
childs time relative interests makes it so. This suggests
that the violation of the childs time relative interests is
at best a comparable evil to the loss of a single addi-
tional infants life, or nine additional embryos lives. But
the anti-abortion substance view theorist would find this
absurd, as it would commit us to conclude that the loss
of a normal humans life is several times worse than the
loss of a fetus; but the substance view theorists criticism
of abortion rests upon the notion that abortion the kill-
ing of a human fetus is the same kind, and degree, of
evil as the killing of an adult human person. If the sub-
stance view theorist held that abortion were a lesser evil
say comparable to jaywalking or purse snatching then
there would be much less urgency and fervor in the
debate.
If Friberg-Fernross version of the substance view is
committed to the view that the loss of several rational
substances lives is outweighed by the frustration of
anothers time-relative interests, then it would be com-
mitted to accepting most abortions. For example, it
seems it might be committed to concluding that abortion
might be morally acceptable even obligatory in the
following case:
A woman genuinely wants to give birth to, and raise,
children of her own. She becomes pregnant. In her
seventh month of pregnancy, the woman recalls that
she had scheduled her dream trip abroad and wants
an abortion to avoid the nuisance of postponing the
trip. She believes that she can always get pregnant
with a replacement fetus after the trip.21
Pro-choice theorist Judith Jarvis Thomson contends
that it would be indecent of a woman to get an abortion
in such a case; yet Friberg-Fernross analysis seems to
suggest that abortion might be morally obligatory, as
failure to abort frustrates her time relative interests in
her dream trip. If the time relative interests of a 10-year-
old child outweigh the evil produced by nine additional
human embryo-deaths, then it is at least plausible that
the time relative interests of the woman in her dream trip
might outweigh the evil produced by one human
embryo-death. Compared to this, the majority of abor-
tions done by pregnant women who do not want a child
would seem downright quaint and unproblematic on
Friberg-Fernross view.
A substance view theorist might be able to avoid this
conclusion by appealing to some additional factor
beyond expected grief and additional frustration of time-
relative interests that would allow them to explain why
we ought to save a single 10-year-old childs life over
that of two infants or 10 fetuses, but not sacrifice fetuses
to prevent the frustration of the womans time relative
interests regarding her trip. Friberg-Fernros does not do
this, and its not clear what factor could fill this role.
2.1 The Problem of Spontaneous Abortion
Many pregnancies upwards of 60% end in spontane-
ous abortion. In light of this, Lovering says Given [the
substance view], what this means is that beings with
intrinsic value and moral standing equal to individuals
[whose deaths we agree would be a substantial loss] are
perishing annually in astonishing numbers.22 He contin-
ues I know of no one. . . who has given any (let alone
serious and considerable) consideration to thwarting the
epidemic of spontaneous abortions. If the substance
view is right, and the loss of the lives of human fetuses is
comparable to the loss of your or my life, then our fail-
ure to give serious and considerable consideration to
and, in turn, attempt to do something about this
epidemic is almost certainly immoral.
The problem of spontaneous abortion is, in fact, two
problems, that follow analytically from the tenets of
the substance view.
(6) Spontaneous human abortion is the loss of inher-
ently valuable beings. (From (2), (4))
In light of (6), it seems that substance view theorists
ought to hold the following three things to be true - inso-
far as spontaneous human abortion is the loss of some-
thing with the same value as you or I:
(7) Because the loss of a spontaneously aborted child
is comparable to the loss of you or I, we ought to
mourn this loss.
(8) We have a strong moral obligation to prevent the
loss of inherently valuable beings.
(9) We have a strong moral obligation to prevent
spontaneous human abortions if possible. (From
(6), (8))
20 J. McMahan. 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of
Life. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
21 J.J. Thomson. A Defense of Abortion. Philos Public Affs 1972; 1(1):
47 66. 22 Lovering, op. cit. note 1, p. 268.
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However, it seems as though substance view theorists
fail to recognize either (7) or (9). There is no impetus to
mourn the dead lost through spontaneous abortion. Fur-
thermore, substance view theorists spend far more time
talking about the loss caused by induced abortion than
the far higher losses resulting from spontaneous abor-
tion, suggesting they dont care about the latter.
2.2.1The Control Principle Reply
Friberg-Fernross reply to the problem of spontaneous
abortion focuses exclusively on our moral obligations
with regard to preventing spontaneous abortions. He
notes that we cannot be morally obligated to do the
impossible; ought implies can. Insofar as we cannot at
least at present stop spontaneous abortions, we cannot
have the moral obligation to do so. According to the
control principle, moral responsibility requires control; a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition of xs being
morally responsible for some y is that y is within xs con-
trol. Because its outside of our control whether or not
spontaneous abortions occur, we cannot be morally
responsible for failing to stop spontaneous abortions.
Friberg-Fernros, like George and Tollefsen before him,
note that many spontaneous abortions result from flaws
in the human embryo that reduce its viability.23 While
Friberg-Fernros raises this in regard to our moral obliga-
tions (if these fetuses are going to die regardless of what
we do, we cannot be morally obligated to prevent their
deaths); George and Tollefsens discussion of these abor-
tions as inevitable has different significance. On their view,
if these abortions are the destruction of a substance that
can never achieve first-order rationality, then they lack
second-order rationality and are thus not (second-order)
rational substances/humans/persons. This is to say that a
large percentage of spontaneously aborted embryos are
not human (in the sense relevant to substance view theo-
rists; although they are biologically human). Assuming
that 60% of pregnancies end with spontaneous abortion,
and 50% of those pregnancies end because of the lack of
viability of the fetus; it seems that the substance view the-
orist might be committed to the view that only 70% of fer-
tilized human egg cells are (second-order) rational
substances/persons from the moment of conception,
because 30% are doomed to spontaneously abort. If this
is the case, then for the substance view theorist, abortion
is not always wrong because fetuses are often not human
persons with a full right to life from conception.
It is uncontroversially true that most pregnant women
are first-order rational substances whose deaths would be
a significant moral loss. Certainly some spontaneous
abortions pose a threat to pregnant women, as such the
induced abortion of a non-human substance fetus would
be desirable independent of any concerns about the
womans time-relative interests and insofar as the woman
is a first-order rational substance, substance view theo-
rists would have substantive moral reasons to pursue
technology that would allow us to distinguish between
zygotes with second-order rationality and those without
it. The lack of interest in this issue by substance view the-
orists is, to borrow Loverings terminology, almost cer-
tainly immoral.24
Suppose that we discovered some chemical that, when
injected into one of these embryos otherwise doomed to
spontaneously abort, would make the embryo viable.
One might think the substance view would advocate
using such a chemical to cure the fetus; not so. Whether
or not a thing possesses second-order rationality is an
essential substantial trait for substance view theorists; if
these fetuses lack this trait, then giving them this trait
would be forcing them to undergo a substantial change
destroying the original unviable fetus, and replacing it
with a new entity. This is a subtle distinction that allows
the substance view theorist to completely disregard unvi-
able fetuses, but I suspect this distinction would be
rejected by the majority of anti-abortion advocates who
appeal to the substance view to explain their anti-
abortion beliefs.
In light of the fact that we cannot (and, for the
substance view, have no obligation to) save 50% of spon-
taneously aborted fetuses, what are our obligations?
Friberg-Fernros says Admittedly, we currently are in a
situation where we do have possibilities to attempt to do
something about embryo loss.25 However, preventing
such losses, he contends, is very difficult. Many spontane-
ous abortions occur before the woman is even aware that
she is pregnant, about which he says a fact which also
makes it hard to see how one can do anything about it.
Not so! If one was serious about preventing spontane-
ous abortions and advocates of the substance view really
ought to be then the answer is clear; a woman who has
engaged in activities that might foreseeably result in preg-
nancy should err on the side of caution, and assume they
are pregnant until medical testing proves beyond a
shadow of a doubt that they are not.
Suppose that you are backing out of a parking spot
with your vision obstructed such that you cannot be sure
whether or not youre backing into vulnerable pedes-
trians. It strikes me that you should back out slowly, and
should not take any risks that would result in pedestrian
harm if a pedestrian happened to be in your blind spot.
Friberg-Fernros view, on the other hand, seems to sug-
gest that you should disregard your blind spots when
pulling out ensuring that you dont run over your
neighbors children, after all, is difficult at least
23 Friberg Fernros, op. cit. 214; George & Tollefsen, op. cit. note 2,
p. 137.
24 Lovering, op. cit. note 1, 268
25 Friberg Fernros, op. cit. note 3, p.214.
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compared with the alternative of ignoring the possibility
of their existence entirely and doing whatever you please.
If the substance view is correct, then women who
might be pregnant are, at least, prima facie morally obli-
gated to act cautiously. The cost of failing to do so, after
all, might be by assumption comparable to the loss of
a full human person like you or I. However, few anti-
abortion theorists that appeal to the substance view
believe that women have such obligations.
2.3 The Relevance of Spontaneous Abortion
Suppose that our current medical technology can do noth-
ing to prevent spontaneous human abortions. Many inher-
ently valuable substances due to mysterious circumstances
die before they are ever born, before they acquire time rel-
ative interests. Because we cannot be morally obligated to
prevent something that we have no control over, we cannot
be morally obligated to prevent (many) spontaneous abor-
tions. However, this does not mean that spontaneous
human abortions are morally irrelevant; far from it. For
the substance view, spontaneous abortions are an epidemic
- the loss of untold inherently valuable human beings due
to circumstances beyond our control.
Suppose that, on the way home one night, you came
to learn that two thirds of all human beings had just
been killed by circumstances beyond your control for
example, an earthquake, pandemic, or alien invasion.
Fortunately for you, the aliens slaughtered only people
who you didnt personally know (perhaps located on the
other side of the globe). I imagine many of us would be
quite devastated at the loss of life regardless of the fact
that theyre strangers. More importantly, we would want
to know why it happened so that we can take steps to
prevent such horrors in the future! Loverings criticism
of the substance view is simply this: The substance view
holds that there is a horrible, substantial loss of life cur-
rently going on that results in more innocent human sub-
stances being killed than innocent human substances
ever born; yet substance view theorists let this incalcula-
ble tragedy go unmentioned. The fact that there are no
obvious dead bodies is no excuse for substance view the-
orists to ignore the incredible loss of lives that surrounds
them. To do so is monstrous, and to mourn the deaths
of human fetuses killed by induced abortion but not that
of those killed by spontaneous abortion is hypocritical.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have argued that Friberg-Fernross
response to Loverings critique of the substance view is
unsatisfactory. Lovering argues that the substance view is
committed to the position that human fetuses are
morally equivalent to the adult human persons, but that
our intuitions in rescue cases suggests otherwise. Further-
more, he argues that if the substance view is to be con-
sistent, it should regard the loss in a spontaneous
abortion as comparable to the loss of other fetuses,
which again for the view would be comparable to the
loss of adult human persons like you or I. Friberg-
Fernros argues that the loss of a non-fetus human person
is substantively worse than the loss of human fetuses,
but this view would be rejected by most substance view
theorists and is inconsistent with the anti-abortion sub-
stance view argument. The substance view argues that
abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is the
death of full human persons comparable to you or I; but
if Friberg-Fernros is correct, then the substance view
cannot argue any such thing; on his view the death of
human zygotes is morally insignificant compared to the
loss of adult human persons that are more likely to sur-
vive, possess more time-relative interests, and for whom
apparently more people would grieve. Indeed, if Friberg-
Fernross account of the role of time relative interests is
correct, then many abortions are not only morally
acceptable, but morally obligatory. Friberg-Fernross
defense of the substance view commits him to what can
be described as a pro-abortion stance, the view that
that in many cases a womans time-relative interests
make it morally obligatory for her to have an abortion
even if she otherwise wants to have a child. On this view,
a woman would only be morally permitted to go through
with a pregnancy if the burden of pregnancy didnt sig-
nificantly conflict with her time-relative interests. On this
view, some women who want to give birth would be
morally permitted to go through with pregnancy, but
quite a few women who otherwise would want to have
children might be morally obligated to have an abortion
and have a replacement child at some point in the future
that didnt conflict with their other time-relative interests.
Not only has Friberg-Fernros failed to satisfactorily
address Loverings concerns about the substance view, he
has offered an interpretation of the view radically incon-
sistent with the views held by anti-abortion theorists who
appeal to the substance view to explain their position on
abortion.
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